I just read an article by Paul Krugman (via Gene Expression) about comparative advantage: Ricardo's Difficult Idea. Comparative advantage explains why trade makes all parties wealthier, even when one is better at doing all things (has higher productivity) than the other. To be more precise, the article is not about comparative advantage per se, but about the difficulties in getting the general public to understand it. What is truly breathtaking about the article is that this avowed leftist Bush-hater makes a very eloquent case against the prevailing intellectual zeitgeist, and in favor of - Conservatism!
Modern intellectuals are supposed to be daring innovators, not respecters of tradition. As any publisher will tell you, books about startling new scientific discoveries always sell better than books about known areas of science, even though the things science already knows are in many ways stranger than any of the speculations in the latest cosmological best-seller. Old ideas are viewed as boring, even if few people have heard of them; new ideas, even if they are probably wrong and not terribly important, are far more attractive. And books that say (or seem to say) that the experts have all been wrong are far more likely to attract a wide audience than books that explain why the experts are probably right. Stephen Jay Gould's Wonderful Life (Gould 1989) which to many readers seemed to say that recent discoveries refute Darwinian orthodoxy, attracted far more attention than Richard Dawkins' equally well-written The Blind Watchmaker (Dawkins 1986), which explained the astonishing implications of that orthodoxy.
He even elucidates intellectual fondness for impenetrable ideas, even when they are wrong:
Intellectuals do reserve, both in evolution and economics, a small pedestal for mathematical modelers -- as long as their models are confusing and seem to refute orthodoxy. Call it the "Santa Fe syndrome". At one point in Dennett's book he reports a list of the top ten objections raised to Steven Pinker's theories about the evolution of language; one of them is "Natural selection is irrelevant, because now we have chaos theory". At about the same time I read this passage I had received a barrage of protests over an article that tried, without explicit mathematics, to walk through some simple models of international trade (Krugman 1994); several of the letters insisted that because of nonlinear dynamics it was impossible to reach any meaningful conclusions from simple models. ("Have you ever thought about the implications of increasing returns? You should read the work of Brian Arthur and Paul Romer.")
There are two odd things about the popularity of certain kinds of mathematical modeling among intellectuals who are generally hostile to such models. One is that the preferred models are typically far more difficult and obscure than the standard models in the field. The other is that the supposedly heterodox conclusions of these models are often not heterodox at all. To take a theme common to both evolution and economics: the idea that small random events can under certain conditions set in motion a cumulative process of change is the theme both of "peacock's tail" accounts of sexual selection and of external economy accounts of international specialization, both familiar stories that lie well inside the boundaries of academic orthodoxy, stories that can be and are illustrated with simple models in advanced undergraduate textbooks like Maynard Smith (1989) and Krugman and Obstfeld (1994). Yet many intellectuals believe that this idea was discovered at Santa Fe and challenges the foundations of both fields.
The secret to the popularity of certain mathematical modelers, I suspect, is that they are valued precisely because they seem to absolve intellectuals from the need to understand the models that underpin orthodox views. Hardly anyone tries to understand what the Santa Fe theorists are actually saying; it is the pose of opposition to received wisdom, together with the implication that in a complicated world you can't learn anything from simple models anyway, that is valued, because it seems to say that not knowing what's in the textbooks is OK.
I, myself, have a fondness for both evolution and economics precisely because they are, at heart, so simple. But as they say about the game, Go: A minute to learn - a lifetime to master! So too, evolution and economics. The more you look at them, the more interesting and surprising they get. A good friend of mine who is an economist once told me, he has the feeling that if Adam Smith were to come back to life, he would look around at the field and say, "That's obvious!" I get the same feeling about Darwin, though in his case he did his work with no knowledge of genetics. He would probably say, "Eureka, the missing link! Now I understand everything!"
Krugman lists three non-obvious assumptions that you have to understand before you can understand comparative advantage:
Wages are determined in a national labor market
Constant employment is a reasonable approximation
The balance of payments is not a problem
I would list two:
Economics is not a zero-sum game - in a voluntary transaction everybody wins
Economics is a feedback system - in the long run, secondary effects can be greater than direct effects
These are both hard concepts - not well understood by most people in theory. In practice, people understand them very well when applied to their personal lives: "I have too much corn, and you have too much cloth, let's trade some of my corn for your cloth", or "If you do everything for your children, they'll never learn to stand on their own feet". The first illustrates that economics is not a zero-sum game, the second that secondary effects (teaching your children to stand on their own feet) are sometimes more important than direct effects (doing something for your children). I would call Krugman's three assumptions examples of his "Sante Fe syndrome" - they are hard concepts which are used to supposedly refute the point, but instead merely obscure it - without refuting it.
Posted by David Boxenhorn at November 30, 2004 11:41 AM"in a voluntary transaction everybody wins"
Economists are fond of saying this and but it isn't necessarily so. For example, I go to a shop and buy some headphones, but return home to find they don't fit my player.
OTOH, I might be coerced into joining the choir at school only to discover after a month or so that I'm enjoying it hugely.
Voluntary interactions tend to win out over coercive ones because they don't impede our creativity. It's then easier to correct errors and so make better future decisions.
Posted by: Tom Robinson at December 1, 2004 12:59 AM PermalinkOf course, people can make mistakes. But if you don't trust the individual's ability to make decisions, then you have a severe form of totalitarianism.
Posted by: David Boxenhorn at December 1, 2004 08:04 AM PermalinkOrganic models are the simplest and the most powerful. Both economics and evolution are organic systems. Optimization models, like genetic algorithms, work well for both. And John Maynard Smith's great classic, Evolution and the Theory of Games, while it was written for game theorists and evolutionary biologists, has found tremendous application in the field of economics.
SJ Gould should have been burnt at the stake long ago. He is a heretic and a dissembler.
Did you know that the Blind Watchmaker inspired the British company (NaturalMotion) that did the cgi for LOTRIII? Torsten Reil, one of the two co-founders was inspired by Dawkins and Watchmaker. Reil's thesis at Oxford combined the evolutionary principles of adaptation and emergence with neural nets and genetic algorithms. Most of the 15,000 horses in Return of the King were [beautifully] modelled with NaturalMotion's Endorphin software. My point is, to accurately model organic systems, one must use organic models. It matters not if the process being modelled is a galloping horse, international trade, or assimilation of french muslim immigrant populations.
Jinnderella: What is the definition of an organic system, according to your usage? How does that apply to a galloping horse?
Posted by: David Boxenhorn at December 4, 2004 04:56 PM PermalinkAn organic system is carbon based, alive as we understand life, as opposed to say, wweather models, or the classic chaos theory example, a brook running over stones generating noise. Organic models ape organic behavior-- what does the horse do? It gallops, it moves. The Endorphin software "grows" a motion paradigm that results in life-like motion.
Posted by: jinnderella at December 5, 2004 02:04 AM PermalinkThe Endorphin software "grows" a motion paradigm that results in life-like motion.
Do you mean by this that more successful motion survives and less unsuccessful motion dies out, subject to low levels of random variation?
I have long thought of both evolution and economics as similar to Newton's method: seemingly inexact, but so powerful it works even in a very noisy system. (I once used Newton's method as part of a software system. Everything worked fine, then one day I realized that the registers were regularly overflowing, yet still it worked!)
Posted by: David Boxenhorn at December 5, 2004 08:18 AM Permalink